VIRGINIA STATE BAR VS. BLOGGING LAWYER

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Virginia State Bar’s crackdown on lawyer’s blog raises questions

 

By Catherine Ho, Published: October 9

 

Virginia lawyers who blog about their cases, beware: the state bar may come after you for inappropriate advertising.

At least that’s the message the Virginia State Bar seems to be sending in a case against Richmond criminal defense attorney Horace Hunter. The bar has brought a misconduct charge against Hunter, who blogs on his firm’s Web site about cases he’s worked on, as well as national and local criminal justice issues. Bar authorities contend the blog constitutes advertisement and should include a disclaimer saying it’s an ad. Hunter argues the blog is news and commentary, and the bar’s attempt to get him to tack on a disclaimer is a violation of his First Amendment rights.

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One purpose of the Web site is to market the firm and attract business, so any discussion of Hunter’s cases is considered advertising and must include a disclaimer “that puts the case results in a context that is not misleading,” the charge said.

Hunter’s case, which is scheduled for a hearing Oct. 18, appears to be the first time the Virginia State Bar has lodged a formal charge against an attorney over blogging and whether it violates advertising rules. State bar counsel Edward Davis would neither confirm nor deny the existence of previous charges against lawyers over blogs and advertising, but there is no record of disciplinary action against Virginia attorneys regarding the matter, according to the bar’s archives of disciplinary actions dating back to 1999. The bar can suspend or disbar attorneys found in violation of legal ethics.

Davis declined to comment on the pending case.

Hunter’s case has some lawyers — for whom blogging has become commonplace — as well as free speech and social media law experts questioning whether the bar is overreaching in its regulation of online speech in the social media age.

State bars prohibit misleading advertising, requiring lawyers when listing previous wins to include disclaimers saying every case is different and that prior results don’t guarantee future success, said Rodney Smolla, a leading First Amendment scholar and president of Furman University in South Carolina. But Smolla, a former dean at Washington and Lee University School of Law who filed a brief before the state bar on Hunter’s behalf, said Hunter’s blog resembles journalism more than advertising.

“I don’t think the mere fact that a lawyer has been involved in a case means everything a lawyer says about it is an advertisement for future clients,” he said. “Lawyers talk about their own cases all the time, in public settings, publications … and members of the public are able to take that speech for what it’s worth.”

Social media rules

The bar’s position in Hunter’s case conflicts with the general movement in legal advertising that encourages the use of social media without placing undue burdens on lawyers, said Brad Shear, a Bethesda attorney who specializes in social media law.

The American Bar Association’s Commission on Ethics recently said no new restrictions were necessary to regulate lawyers’ use of technology and client development, and that prohibiting Internet and other electronic advertising would “impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. (See the commission’s June recommendations here).

“If the Virginia Bar believes that blogs that discuss news and commentary should have stringent disclaimers that precede the content because they are deemed to be advertisements, then the Virginia Bar may have to require that every blog post, blog comments on other blogs and other user-generated content by an attorney to contain a strict disclaimer,” said Shear, who has no ties to the Hunter case. “It becomes a slippery slope.”

The Virginia State Bar is limited to regulating practices and disciplining lawyers in Virginia, but Smolla said its decision could set precedent in any jurisdiction.

“I don’t know if other bar authorities would or wouldn’t feel they’d want to prosecute these things, but it’d be a warning sign that this kind of activity could draw some sort of disciplinary action,” he said. “It could exert a chilling effect on all lawyers that blog on litigation results, particularly if those results are involving matters on which they’ve worked as a lawyer.”

Bob O’Neil, founder and former director of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and former president of the University of Virginia, said Hunter’s blog is not misleading, and called the bar’s standard on disclaimers “excessive.”

“That strikes me as overkill,” said O’Neil, who is not involved in the case. “Pretty innocent stuff like Hunter’s [blog], I don’t think that’s regulable.”

The charge, filed in March, also says Hunter blogged about information that would be “embarrassing” or “detrimental” to his clients, including using a pseduonym to discuss the case of a juvenile client. Hunter failed to show that he had obtained his clients’ consent to talk about the cases, the charge said. Hunter calls the claims “frivolous” and maintains that the matters discussed on his blog are public, and that he had the permission of the juvenile’s parents to talk about the case.

 

 

 

 

 

Lemon Law Ford Motor Company v. Burnette

http://www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=bdjcca&searchTerm=eEZL.HINa.aadj.eeag&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW

2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 527,*;66 Va. Cir. 462

Stephen C. Burnette, et al. v. Ford Motor Co.

CL 5416

CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY, VIRGINIA

66 Va. Cir. 462; 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 527

February 5, 2001, Decided

DISPOSITION:   

Fees awarded to Davidson, Sakolosky, Mosely &Tiller and Mr Wilson.

COUNSEL:    [*1]  Cary P. Moseley, Esq., Davidson, Sakolosky, Moseley & Tiller, Lynchburg, VA.

G. Edgar Dawson, III, Esq., Petty, Livingston, Dawson & Richards, Lynchburg, VA.

JUDGES:   J. Michael Gamble, Judge.

OPINION BY:   J. Michael Gamble

OPINION   

I am writing this letter to rule in the above case. In this regard, I award to the firm of Davidson, Sakolosky, Moseley & Tiller fees and costs in the amount of $9,294.50. This consists of fees in the amount of $6,860.00 to Mr. Moseley, $1,862.50 to Mr. Wilson, $500.00 for expert witness fees, and $72.00 for filing costs.

Mr. Moseley’s fee is based on 39.2 hours at $175.00 per hour. I have deducted 15.4 hours for the time that Mr. Moseley spent on his efforts to establish an attorney’s fee after January 19, 2001. In my view, the law does not support compensation to Mr. Moseley for time spent establishing the attorney’s fees after the primary Lemon Law claim has settled. Thus, I have deducted 15.4 hours from his time.

While the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act allow for the recovery of attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and court costs, these fees and costs are collateral damages to the compensatory damages  [*2]  and equitable relief for the breach of warranty. Accordingly, it follows that the recovery of attorney’s fees incurred subsequent to the settlement of the primary action are not recoverable.

In the instant case, the primary claim was settled in the period of December 2000 to January 2001. The parties left open the issue of attorney’s fees to be decided by the Court. Because the plaintiffs were successful in achieving the settlement, they are entitled to attorney’s fee up to the point the settlement was implemented. However, the action to recover attorney’s fees subsequent to the settlement violates the Virginia Rule that attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable. The instant proceeding is basically a lawsuit to recover attorney’s fees. To award attorney’s fees in this action to recover attorney’s fees would violate the general rule in Virginia that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in litigation. Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 92, 515 S.E.2d 291 (1999).

Mr. Moseley has sought a fee of $200.00 per hour. I find that the customary fee for lawyers in this area with his experience would be $150.00 per hour. However, he has special expertise for automobile  [*3]  Lemon Law litigation. Accordingly, I am adding $25.00 to his hourly rate. I know that in other jurisdictions, judges have approved $200.00 per hour. However, most of those jurisdictions appear to be more urban jurisdictions were attorney’s fees are naturally higher.

I have set the fee of Mr. Wilson at $125.00 per hour. I have awarded him all of the hours because they were all incurred prior to the settlement.

The plaintiffs incurred $500.00 in expert witness fees, which are reasonable. These are awarded. Additionally, I award the $72.00 filing costs.

J. Michael Gamble, Judge

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MORTGAGE FRAUD NEWS

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/16/foreclosure-fraud-audit-false-claims-act_n_862686.html

WASHINGTON — A set of confidential federal audits accuse the nation’s five largest mortgage companies of defrauding taxpayers in their handling of foreclosures on homes purchased with government-backed loans, four officials briefed on the findings told The Huffington Post.

The five separate investigations were conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s inspector general and examined Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and Ally Financial, the sources said.

The audits accuse the five major lenders of violating the False Claims Act, a Civil War-era law crafted as a weapon against firms that swindle the government. The audits were completed between February and March, the sources said. The internal watchdog office at HUD referred its findings to the Department of Justice, which must now decide whether to file charges.

The federal audits mark the latest fallout from the national foreclosure crisis that followed the end of a long-running housing bubble. Amid reports last year that many large lenders improperly accelerated foreclosure proceedings by failing to amass required paperwork, the federal agencies launched their own probes.

The resulting reports read like veritable indictments of major lenders, the sources said. State officials are now wielding the documents as leverage in their ongoing talks with mortgage companies aimed at forcing the firms to agree to pay fines to resolve allegations of routine violations in their handling of foreclosures.

The audits conclude that the banks effectively cheated taxpayers by presenting the Federal Housing Administration with false claims: They filed for federal reimbursement on foreclosed homes that sold for less than the outstanding loan balance using defective and faulty documents.

Two of the firms, including Bank of America, refused to cooperate with the investigations, according to the sources. The audit on Bank of America finds that the company — the nation’s largest handler of home loans — failed to correct faulty foreclosure practices even after imposing a moratorium that lifted last October. Back then, the bank said it was resuming foreclosures, having satisfied itself that prior problems had been solved.

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According to the sources, the Wells Fargo investigation concludes that senior managers at the firm, the fourth-largest American bank by assets, broke civil laws. HUD’s inspector general interviewed a pair of South Carolina public notaries who improperly signed off on foreclosure filings for Wells, the sources said.

The investigations dovetail with separate probes by state and federal agencies, who also have examined foreclosure filings and flawed mortgage practices amid widespread reports that major mortgage firms improperly initiated foreclosure proceedings on an unknown number of American homeowners.

The FHA, whose defaulted loans the inspector general probed, last May began scrutinizing whether mortgage firms properly treated troubled borrowers who fell behind on payments or whose homes were seized on loans insured by the agency.

A unit of the Justice Department is examining faulty court filings in bankruptcy proceedings. Several states, including Illinois, are combing through foreclosure filings to gauge the extent of so-called “robo-signing” and other defective practices, including illegal home repossessions.

Representatives of HUD and its inspector general declined to comment.

The internal audits have armed state officials with a powerful new weapon as they seek to extract what they describe as punitive fines from lawbreaking mortgage companies.

A coalition of attorneys general from all 50 states and state bank supervisors have joined HUD, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission in talks with the five largest mortgage servicers to settle allegations of illegal foreclosures and other shoddy practices.

Such processes “have potentially infected millions of foreclosures,” Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman Sheila Bair told a Senate panel on Thursday.

The five giant mortgage servicers, which collectively handle about three of every five home loans, offered during a contentious round of negotiations last Tuesday to pay $5 billion to set up a fund to help distressed borrowers and settle the allegations.

That offer — also floated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in February — was deemed much too low by state and federal officials. Associate U.S. Attorney General Tom Perrelli, who has been leading the talks, last week threatened to show the banks the confidential audits so the firms knew the government side was not “playing around,” one official involved in the negotiations said. He ultimately did not follow through, persuaded that the reports ought to remain confidential, sources said. Through a spokeswoman, Perrelli declined to comment.

Most of the targeted banks have not seen the audits, a federal official said, though they are generally aware of the findings.

Some agencies involved in the talks are calling for the five banks to shell out as much as $30 billion, with even more costs to be incurred for improving their internal operations and modifying troubled borrowers’ home loans.

But even that number would fall short of legitimate compensation for the bank’s harmful practices, reckons the nascent federal Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. By taking shortcuts in processing troubled borrowers’ home loans, the nation’s five largest mortgage firms have directly saved themselves more than $20 billion since the housing crisis began in 2007, according to a confidential presentation prepared for state attorneys general by the agency and obtained by The Huffington Post in March. Those pushing for a larger package of fines argue that the foreclosure crisis has spawned broader — and more costly — social ills, from the dislocation of American families to the continued plunge in home prices, effectively wiping out household savings.

The Justice Department is now contemplating whether to use the HUD audits as a basis for civil and criminal enforcement actions, the sources said. The False Claims Act allows the government to recover damages worth three times the actual harm plus additional penalties.

Justice officials will soon meet with the largest servicers and walk them through the allegations and potential liability each of them face, the sources said.

Earlier this month, Justice cited findings from HUD investigations in a lawsuit it filed against Deutsche Bank AG, one of the world’s 10 biggest banks by assets, for at least $1 billion for defrauding taxpayers by “repeatedly” lying to FHA in securing taxpayer-backed insurance for thousands of shoddy mortgages.

In March, HUD’s inspector general found that more than 49 percent of loans underwritten by FHA-approved lenders in a sample did not conform to the agency’s requirements.

Last October, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan said his investigators found that numerous mortgage firms broke the agency’s rules when dealing with delinquent borrowers. He declined to be specific.

The agency’s review later expanded to flawed foreclosure practices. FHA, a unit of HUD, could still take administrative action against those firms for breaking FHA rules based on its own probe.

The confidential findings appear to bolster state and federal officials in their talks with the targeted banks. The knowledge that they may face False Claims Act suits, in addition to state actions based on a multitude of claims like fraud on local courts and consumer violations, will likely compel the banks to offer the government more money to resolve everything.

But even that may not be enough.

Attorneys general in numerous states, armed with what they portray as incontrovertible evidence of mass robo-signings from preliminary investigations, are probing mortgage practices more closely.

The state of Illinois has begun examining potentially-fraudulent court filings, looking at the role played by a unit of Lender Processing Services. Nevada and Arizona already launched lawsuits against Bank of America. California is keen on launching its own suits, people familiar with the matter say. Delaware sent Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., which runs an electronic registry of mortgages, a subpoena demanding answers to 75 questions. And New York’s top law enforcer, Eric Schneiderman, wants to conduct a complete investigation into all facets of mortgage banking, from fraudulent lending to defective securitization practices to faulty foreclosure documents and illegal home seizures.

A review of about 2,800 loans that experienced foreclosure last year serviced by the nation’s 14 largest mortgage firms found that at least two of them illegally foreclosed on the homes of “almost 50″ active-duty military service members, a violation of federal law, according to a report this month from the Government Accountability Office.

Those violations are likely only a small fraction of the number committed by home loan companies, experts say, citing the small sample examined by regulators.

In an April report on flawed mortgage servicing practices, federal bank supervisors said they “could not provide a reliable estimate of the number of foreclosures that should not have proceeded.”

The review of just 2,800 home loans in foreclosure compares with nearly 2.9 million homes that received a foreclosure filing last year, according to RealtyTrac, a California-based data provider.

“The extent of the loss cannot be determined until there is a comprehensive review of the loan files and documentation of the process dealing with problem loans,” Bair said last week, warning of damages that could take “years to materialize.”

Home prices have fallen over the past year, reversing gains made early in the economic recovery, according to data providers Zillow.com and CoreLogic. Sales of new homes remain depressed, according to the Commerce Department. More than a quarter of homeowners with a mortgage owe more on that debt than their home is worth, according to Zillow.com. And more than 2 million homes are in foreclosure, according to Lender Processing Services.

Rather than punishing banks for misdeeds, the administration is now focused on helping troubled borrowers in the hope that it will stanch the flood of foreclosures and increase consumer confidence, officials involved in the negotiations said.

Levying penalties can’t accomplish that goal, an official involved in the foreclosure probe talks argued last week.

For their part, however, state officials want to levy fines, according to a confidential term sheet reviewed last week by HuffPost. Each state would then use the money as it desires, be it for facilitating short sales, reducing mortgage principal, or using the funds to help defaulted borrowers move from their homes into rentals.

In a report last week, analysts at Moody’s Investors Service predicted that while the losses incurred by the banks will be “sizable,” the credit rating agency does “not expect them to meaningfully impact capital.”

*************************

Shahien Nasiripour is a senior business reporter for The Huffington Post. You can send him an e-mail; bookmark his page; subscribe to his RSS feed; follow him on Twitter; friend him on Facebook; become a fan; and/or get e-mail alerts when he reports the latest news. He can be reached at 917-267-2335.

Subaru v. Peters (1998 Lemon Law Decision)

June 5, 1998

OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge

This is the first case we have decided by written opinion under the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the Act), Code §§ 59.1-207.9 through –207.16:1, since its 1984 adoption. Acts 1984, ch. 773.

The Act, Virginia’s so-called “Lemon Law,” generally provides that if a consumer has purchased a motor vehicle for nonbusiness purposes and reports, within a specified period of time, a defect or nonconformity covered by the motor vehicle manufacturer’s express warranty, the manufacturer or its agent must perform the repairs necessary to correct the problem. If the vehicle cannot be conformed to the warranty after a reasonable number of attempts, the consumer is entitled to replacement of the vehicle or refund of the purchase price.

Read the full decision below!

http://lw.bna.com/lw/19980623/971821.htm

Worker Compensation

Virginia Worker Compensation *Summary

The Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission is the state agency that administers the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. The following brief summary is intended to provide a general overview of Workers’ Compensation coverage and benefits in Virginia. See the separate topic for help with acronyms. For further information contact your local or state Workers’ Compensation Program office. This information is based on data originally provided by the U.S. Department of Labor and updated by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission, and is current as of July 2008.

In Virginia, compensation benefits are subject to an annual cost of living adjustment (COLA), and changes become effective July 1 of each year. The rates shown below are in effect from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009

Type of Law and Insurance Requirements
In Virginia, workers’ compensation is compulsory, and some waivers are permitted. There is no state fund. Employers may insure through private carriers, self-insurance, or through groups of employers. There is an exemption for employers with fewer than 3 employees.

Coverage of Agricultural Workers
Covers agricultural workers working for an employer who regularly has in service more than 2 full-time employees.

Coverage of Domestic Employees
Domestic servants are specifically excluded from coverage.

Medical Benefits
Full medical benefits are provided with no time or monetary limitations.

Benefits for Temporary Total Disability (TTD)
The percentage of worker’s wage paid is 66 2/3. For weekly payments, the minimum is $210.25 (25% of SAWW or employee’s actual wage, if less) and the maximum is $841, 100% of SAWW. The maximum period of payments is 500 weeks.

Benefits for Permanent Total Disability (PTD)
The percentage of worker’s wage paid is 66 2/3. For weekly payments, the minimum is $210.25 (25% of SAWW or employee’s actual wage, if less) and the maximum is $841, 100% of SAWW. The maximum period of payments is the duration of disability.

Benefits for Permanent Partial Disability (PPD)
The percentage of worker’s wage paid is 66 2/3. For weekly payments, the minimum is $210.25 (25% of SAWW or employee’s actual wage, if less) and the maximum is $841, 100% of SAWW. For non-scheduled injuries, the maximum period of payments is 500 weeks, and the maximum total payable amount is $420,500. The period of payment may be extended if the employee is still disabled within 1 year of final payment.

Disfigurement Benefits
Virginia statutes cover disfigurement described as “Severely marked of head, face, hands, arms or legs”. Benefits are 66-2/3 percent of employee’s average weekly wages, for a maximum period of 60 weeks.

Virginia Lemon Law

Virginia Lemon Law Statutes  

Title 59.1, Chapter 17.3, §59.1-207.9 – §59.1-207.16

§ 59.1-207.9

This chapter may be cited as the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act.

§ 59.1-207.10

The General Assembly recognizes that a motor vehicle is a major consumer purchase, and there is no doubt that a defective motor vehicle creates a hardship for the consumer. It is the intent of the General Assembly that a good faith motor vehicle warranty complaint by a consumer should be resolved by the manufacturer, or its agent, within a specified period of time. It is further the intent of the General Assembly to provide the statutory procedures whereby a consumer may receive a replacement motor vehicle, or a full refund, for a motor vehicle which cannot be brought into conformity with the express warranty issued by the manufacturer. However, nothing in this chapter shall in any way limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law.

§ 59.1-207.11

As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

“Collateral charges” means any sales-related charges including but not limited to sales tax, license fees, registration fees, title fees, finance charges and interest, transportation charges, dealer preparation charges or any other charges for service contracts, undercoating, rust proofing or installed options, not recoverable from a third party.

“Comparable motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle that is identical or reasonably equivalent to the motor vehicle to be replaced, as the motor vehicle to be replaced existed at the time of purchase with an offset from this value for a reasonable allowance for its use.

“Consumer” means the purchaser, other than for purposes of resale, of a motor vehicle used in substantial part for personal, family, or household purposes, and any person to whom such motor vehicle is transferred for the same purposes during the duration of any warranty applicable to such motor vehicle, and any other person entitled by the terms of such warranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty.

“Incidental damages” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 8.2-715.

“Lemon law rights period” means the period ending eighteen months after the date of the original delivery to the consumer of a new motor vehicle. This shall be the period during which the consumer can report any nonconformity to the manufacturer and pursue any rights provided for under this chapter.

“Lien” means a security interest in a motor vehicle.

“Lienholder” means a person, partnership, association, corporation or entity with a security interest in a motor vehicle pursuant to a lien.

“Manufacturer” means a person, partnership, association, corporation or entity engaged in the business of manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles, or of distributing motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers.

“Manufacturer’s express warranty” means the written warranty, so labeled, of the manufacturer of a new automobile, including any terms or conditions precedent to the enforcement of obligations under that warranty.

“Motor vehicle” means only passenger cars, pickup or panel trucks, motorcycles, self-propelled motorized chassis of motor homes and mopeds as those terms are defined in § 46.2-100 and demonstrators or lease purchase vehicles with which a warranty was issued.

“Motor vehicle dealer” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 46.2-1500.

“Nonconformity” means a failure to conform with a warranty, a defect or a condition, including those that do not affect the driveability of the vehicle, which significantly impairs the use, market value, or safety of a motor vehicle.

“Notify” or “notification” means that the manufacturer shall be deemed to have been notified under this chapter if a written complaint of the defect or defects has been mailed to it or it has responded to the consumer in writing regarding a complaint, or a factory representative has either inspected the vehicle or met with the consumer or an authorized dealer regarding the nonconformity.

“Reasonable allowance for use” shall not exceed one-half of the amount allowed per mile by the Internal Revenue Service, as provided by regulation, revenue procedure, or revenue ruling promulgated pursuant to § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, for use of a personal vehicle for business purposes, plus an amount to account for any loss to the fair market value of the vehicle resulting from damage beyond normal wear and tear, unless the damage resulted from nonconformity to any warranty.

“Serious safety defect” means a life-threatening malfunction or nonconformity that impedes the consumer’s ability to control or operate the new motor vehicle for ordinary use or reasonable intended purposes or creates a risk of fire or explosion.

“Significant impairment” means to render the new motor vehicle unfit, unreliable or unsafe for ordinary use or reasonable intended purposes.

“Warranty” means any implied warranty or any written warranty of the manufacturer, or any affirmations of fact or promise made by the manufacturer in connection with the sale of a motor vehicle that become part of the basis of the bargain. The term “warranty” pertains to the obligations of the manufacturer in relation to materials, workmanship, and fitness of a motor vehicle for ordinary use or reasonable intended purposes throughout the duration of the lemon law rights period as defined under this section.

§ 59.1-207.12
Conformity to all warranties

If a new motor vehicle does not conform to all warranties, and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agents, or its authorized dealer during the manufacturer’s warranty period, the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer shall make such repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such warranties, notwithstanding the fact that such repairs are made after the expiration of such manufacturer’s warranty period.

§ 59.1-207.13
Nonconformity of motor vehicles

  1. If the manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers do not conform the motor vehicle to any applicable warranty by repairing or correcting any defect or condition, including those that do not affect the driveability of the vehicle, which significantly impairs the use, market value, or safety of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts during the lemon law rights period, the manufacturer shall:

 

  1. Replace the motor vehicle with a comparable motor vehicle acceptable to the consumer, or

 

  1. Accept return of the motor vehicle and refund to the consumer and any lienholder as their interest may appear the full purchase price, including all collateral charges, incidental damages, less a reasonable allowance for the consumer’s use of the vehicle up to the date of the first notice of nonconformity that is given to the manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealer. The consumer shall have the unconditional right to choose a refund rather than a replacement vehicle and to drive the motor vehicle until he receives either the replacement vehicle or the refund. The subtraction of a reasonable allowance for use shall apply to either a replacement or refund of the motor vehicle. Mileage, expenses, and reasonable loss of use necessitated by attempts to conform such motor vehicle to the express warranty may be recovered by the consumer.

 

  1. It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to any warranty and that the motor vehicle is significantly impaired if during the period of eighteen months following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer either:

 

  1. The same nonconformity has been subject to repair three or more times by the manufacturer, its agents or its authorized dealers and the same nonconformity continues to exist;

 

  1. The nonconformity is a serious safety defect and has been subject to repair one or more times by the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer and the same nonconformity continues to exist; or

 

  1. The motor vehicle is out of service due to repair for a cumulative total of thirty calendar days, unless such repairs could not be performed because of conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers, including war, invasion, strike, fire, flood or other natural disasters.

 

  1. The lemon law rights period shall be extended if the manufacturer has been notified but the nonconformity has not been effectively repaired by the manufacturer, or its agent, by the expiration of the lemon law rights period.

 

  1. The manufacturer shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer, in the warranty or owner’s manual, that written notification of the nonconformity to the manufacturer is required before the consumer may be eligible for refund or replacement of the vehicle under this chapter. The manufacturer shall include with the warranty or owner’s manual the name and address to which the consumer shall send such written notification.

 

  1. It shall be the responsibility of the consumer, or his representative, prior to availing himself of the provisions of this section, to notify the manufacturer of the need for the correction or repair of the nonconformity, unless the manufacturer has been notified as defined in § 59.1-207.11. If the manufacturer or factory representative has not been notified of the conditions set forth in subsection B of this section and any of the conditions set forth in subsection B of this section already exists, the manufacturer shall be given an additional opportunity, not to exceed fifteen days, to correct or repair the nonconformity. If notification shall be mailed to an authorized dealer, the authorized dealer shall upon receipt forward such notification to the manufacturer.

 

  1. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the rights and remedies of a consumer under any other law.

 

  1. It is an affirmative defense to any claim under this chapter that:

 

  1. An alleged nonconformity does not significantly impair the use, market value, or safety of the motor vehicle; or

 

  1. A nonconformity is the result of abuse, neglect or unauthorized modification or alteration of a motor vehicle by a consumer.

§ 59.1-207.14
Action to enforce provisions of chapter

Any consumer who suffers loss by reason of a violation of any provision of this chapter may bring a civil action to enforce such provision. Any consumer who is successful in such an action or any defendant in any frivolous action brought by a consumer shall recover reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees and court costs incurred by bringing such actions.

§ 59.1-207.15
Informal dispute settlement procedure

  1. If a manufacturer provides an informal dispute settlement procedure, it shall be the consumer’s choice whether or not to use it prior to availing himself of his rights under this chapter.

 

  1. If a dispute settlement procedure is resorted to by the consumer and the decision is for a refund or a comparable motor vehicle, the manufacturer shall have forty days from its receipt of the consumer’s acceptance of the decision or from the date of a court order to comply with the terms of the decision.

 

  1. In any action brought because of the manufacturer’s failure to comply with the decision, within the scope of the procedure’s authority, rendered as a result of a dispute resolution proceeding or a court order, the court may triple the value of the award stipulated in the decision as provided for in this chapter, plus award other equitable relief the court deems appropriate, including additional attorney’s fees.

§ 59.1-207.16
Action to be brought within certain time

Any action brought under this chapter shall be commenced within the lemon law rights period following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer; however, any consumer whose good faith attempts to settle the dispute have not resulted in the satisfactory correction or repair of the nonconformity, replacement of the motor vehicle or refund to the consumer of the amount described in subdivision 2 of subsection A of § 59.1-207.13, shall have twelve months from the date of the final action taken by the manufacturer in its dispute settlement procedure or within the lemon law rights period, whichever is longer, to file an action in the proper court, provided the consumer has rejected the manufacturer’s final action.